A completeness theorem is established for logics with congruence endowed with general semantics (in the style of general frames). As a corollary, completeness is shown to be preserved by fibring logics with congruence provided that congruence is retained in the resulting logic. The class of logics with equivalence is shown to be closed under fibring and to be included in the class of logics with congruence. Thus, completeness is shown to be preserved by fibring logics with equivalence and general semantics. An example is provided showing that completeness is not always preserved by fibring logics endowed with standard (non general) semantics. A categorial characterization of fibring is provided using coproducts and cocartesian liftings.
Introduction
Much attention has been recently given to the problems of combining logics and obtaining transference results. Besides leading to very interesting applications whenever it is necessary to work with different logics at the same time, combination of logics is of interest on purely theoretical grounds [BdR97] .
Among the different techniques for combining logics, fibring [Gab96a, Gab96b, Gab99] deserves close study. When fibring two given logics we produce a logic where we allow the free mixing of the connectives from both logics and we use the proof rules from both logics. In [SSC99] an explicit semantics is provided for fibring. Therein, soundness is shown to be preserved by fibring, but the preservation of completeness is left as an open problem.
Herein, we concentrate on the problem of preservation of completeness. The final result of the paper is a positive answer to this question with reasonable requirements on the two given logics ("full" semantics and availability of "equivalence"). Since, "equivalence" implies "congruence" and the former is preserved by fibring, the preservation of strong completeness is a consequence of the completeness theorem for general semantics: every logic system with "full" semantics and with "congruence" is strongly complete.
In Section 2 we briefly review Hilbert calculi and their fibrings (free and constrained by sharing symbols). In Section 3 we introduce general interpretation systems and their fibrings. The notion of general interpretation systems generalizes the notion of interpretation system as adopted in [SSC99] . This generalization follows the style of general frames for modal logic (see for example [HC96] ), herein in a more general context.
In Section 4, we bring together Hilbert calculi and general interpretation systems in order to establish the appropriate notion of general logic system where we can study completeness. We present two examples from modal logic, using the standard (non general) semantics. The first example shows a case of preservation of weak completeness by fibring as a direct corollary of the results in [KW91] . The second example, based upon [Wol96] , shows a case where weak completeness is not preserved.
In Section 5, we obtain a (strong) completeness theorem for logic systems with full general semantics and with congruence, using an adapted Henkin construction. As a corollary, completeness is shown to be preserved by fibring logics with congruence provided that congruence is retained in the resulting logic. Unfortunately, congruence is not always preserved by fibring as shown by the counterexample provided at the end of Section 5.
In Section 6, we introduce the notion of logic with equivalence and show that the class of logics with equivalence is closed under fibring and is a subclass of the class of logics with congruence. Thus, completeness is shown to be preserved by fibring logics with equivalence and general semantics. The class of logics with equivalence is a very wide one and includes classical, intuitionistic, minimal and all modal propostional logics, as well as any other extension of basic logic ( [SBF] ). Along the way, we also establish other preservation results like the preservation of the metatheorem of deduction by fibring.
At both proof-theoretic and model-theoretic levels, we provide a categorial characterization of fibring. The categorial constructions corresponding to fibrings of (general) interpretation systems was much simplified herein compared to [SSC99] thanks to the possibility of working, without any loss of generality, with interpretation systems closed for disjoint unions (of the world spaces). This simplification is clear in the elegant notion of morphism between general interpretation systems. The use of categorial constructions (coproducts and cocartesian liftings) for characterizing mechanisms for combining logics was already advocated in [SSC97a, SSC97b] for a simpler form of combination (synchronization). The reader less inclined to category theory may skip the subsections on categorial constructions without any loss of continuity. Anyway, only elementary notions are borrowed from category theory. They are presented for instance in [BW90] .
Hilbert calculi
Since we work only with propositional-based logics, the following notion of signature is enough: a signature is a family C = {C k } k∈N where each C k is a set. The elements of C k are called constructors of arity k.
Given a signature C and a set Ξ (of schema variables), we can construct formulae as follows: the set L(C, Ξ) of schema formulae is the smallest set which contains C 0 ∪ Ξ and is closed under constructors in C, that is, if c ∈ C k and γ 1 , . . . , γ k ∈ L(C, Ξ), then c(γ 1 , . . . , γ k ) ∈ L(C, Ξ). The elements of L(C, ∅) are called formulae. The elements of Ξ are the (atomic) schema formulae for which substitution is allowed: a substitution is a function σ : Ξ → L(C, Ξ). Given any schema formula γ, the instance of γ by the substitution σ is denoted by γσ and is the result of simultaneously replacing each ξ ∈ Ξ in γ by σ(ξ). For sets Γ of schema formulae, we will write Γσ to denote {γσ : γ ∈ Γ}.
In the sequel, the letter C always denotes a given signature and the set Ξ is assumed to be fixed once for all; we assume also that Ξ is disjoint from each C k . Given two signatures C , C , we denote by C ∩ C their intersection:
Given any r = Γ, γ in P , the (finite) set Γ is the set of premises of r and γ is the conclusion; we will often write r = Prem(r), Conc(r) . If Prem(r) = ∅, then r is said to be an axiom schema; otherwise, it is said to be a proof rule schema. Each r in D is said to be a derivation rule schema. We delay until the example below an explanation of the advantages of distinguishing between proof and derivation rules.
+ such that γ m = δ and, for i = 1 to m, either
(2) there exist a rule r ∈ P and a substitution σ such that Conc(r)σ = γ i and Prem(r)σ ⊆ {γ 1 , . . . , γ i−1 }.
When Γ = ∅, we say that δ is provable.
+ such that γ m = δ and, for i = 1 to m, either 
Clearly, every derivable formula from a set Γ is also provable from Γ. The next example illustrates the need for distinguishing between "proof" and "derivation".
Example 2.4
In a modal Hilbert calculi we have that P ⊇ P 0 ∪ P 2 and D = D 0 , where, for any complete set {ax 1 , . . . , ax n } of schema axioms for propositional logic in the language L(C \ C 0 , Ξ),
Proof rules are to be sound with respect to floating (global) entailment whereas derivation rules are to be sound with respect to contextual (local) entailment (see Section 3).
Both (·) p and (·) d are closure operators. We say that a set of formulae
Definition 2.5 The fibring of the Hilbert calculi C , P , D and C , P , D is the Hilbert calculus
Whenever C ∩ C is the empty signature, the fibring is said to be unconstrained. Otherwise, it is said to be constrained by sharing the symbols in C ∩ C .
We now briefly sketch a categorial characterization of both unconstrained and constrained fibring. To this end, we start by introducing the relevant categories (of signatures and of Hilbert calculi).
A signature morphism h : C → C is a family {h k } k∈N in which each h k is a map from C k into C k . That is, signature morphisms translate constructors preserving their arities. Signatures and their morphisms constitute the category Sig. This category is finitely cocomplete (in the sense that it has all finite colimits). In particular, the category has coproducts and pushouts. It is worthwhile to describe in some detail these constructions as they are used in the sequel.
The coproduct of two signatures C and C is the signature C ⊕ C endowed with injections i :
-(C ⊕ C ) k is the disjoint union of C k and C k , and
In the special case where the two signatures C , C are disjoint, we can consider i , i to be inclusions and completely disregard them. Therefore, in that special case, we can identify the coproduct with the union of signatures (up to isomorphism).
Assuming that f : C → C and f : C → C are injective signature morphisms, the pushout of f and f is the signature C f Cf ⊕ C endowed with the morphisms g :
and similarly for g k .
Note that pushouts exist for any pair f , f of diverging morphisms, but we are interested in pushouts only for sharing constructors. To this end, it is sufficient to consider pushouts of injective morphisms as above.
In the special case where the intersection of the two signatures C , C is C, we can consider f , f to be inclusions and, again, completely disregard them. Therefore, in that special case, we can identify the pushout with the union of signatures (up to isomorphism).
It is well known in elementary category theory that pushouts can be calculated using coproducts and coequalizers. In the case at hand we have:
⊕ C is the codomain of the coequalizer q of the two signature morphisms i • f and i • f .
We now proceed to develop the category of Hilbert calculi.
Definition 2.6 A Hilbert calculus morphism
• h(Conc(r)) is provable from h(P rem(r)) for every r ∈ P ;
It is straightforward to verify (by induction on the length of the proof/derivation) that every Hilbert calculus morphism preserves proofs and derivations:
if
Hilbert calculi and their morphisms constitute the category Hil. Furthermore, the maps:
constitute the forgetful functor N : Hil → Sig. This functor is quite useful for relating Hilbert calculi with their underlying signatures. More interestingly, given a Hilbert calculus over C and signature morphism from C to C , we can build in a canonical way the corresponding Hilbert calculus over C , as follows (using a cocartesian lifting):
Proof: It is trivial to verify that h is a Hilbert calculus morphism. Furthermore, it is straightforward to verify the universal property of the cocartesian lifting: given a Hilbert calculus morphism f : C, P, D → C , P , D and a signature morphism g : C → C such that g • h = f , there is a unique Hilbert calculus morphism j :
Just take j to be g and check that it is indeed a Hilbert calculus morphism.
We denote the codomain of this cocartesian morphism by h( C, P, D ). We are ready at last to provide the envisaged categorial characterization: unconstrained fibring is a coproduct and constrained fibring is obtained by cocartesian lifting. As expected, this caracterization is quite simple for Hilbert calculi, but, more significantly, it will be replicated at the semantic level following precisely the same approach. 
endowed with the injections i , i .
Proof:
It is trivial to verify that i , i are Hilbert calculus morphisms and that the universal property of the coproduct holds. 
where q is the coequalizer of i • f and i • f .
It is trivial to verify that q is a Hilbert calculus morphism and that the universal property of the cocartesian lifting holds.
Clearly, when C is the intersection of C , C and we consider f , f to be the inclusions, this construction leads to C , P , D ∪ C , P , D , as defined in purely set-theoretic terms before.
General interpretation systems
Towards presenting the notion of fibring at the model-theoretic level, we introduce first the interpretation structures we need in order to be able to provide a semantics for a wide class of propositional-based logics.
Definition 3.1 A C-structure is a triple U, B, ν in which U is a non-empty set, B is a non-empty subset of ℘U , and ν = {ν k } k∈N is a family of functions such that
The class of all C-structures will be denoted by Str(C).
The set U is called the set of points. The set B is called the set of admissible valuations. And ν provides the interpretation of the constructors in the signature C. The use of a subset of ℘U as the set of admissible valuations has a long tradition which starts with the Henkin general semantics for second order logic and for the theory of types ( [Hen50] ) and passes through the general frames in modal and temporal logics [Ben83, Ben85, HC96, CZ97] . If, in a C-structure S = U, B, ν , the set B is ℘U , we say that S is standard. Such standard C-structures were adopted in [SSC99] . We need these more general structures in order to obtain a completeness result later on.
Definition 3.2 A pre-interpretation system is a triple C, M, A in which M is a class and A is a map from M into Str(C).
The elements of M in a pre-interpretation system are called models, and, for m ∈ M , A(m) will be also written as U m , B m , ν m . 
where b 1 and b 2 range over B. Since arbitrary unions and finite intersections of R-closed sets are R-closed sets, we have that ν mk (c)(b) belongs to B for all b ∈ B k . If R is an equivalence relation, then B turns out to be a Boolean subalgebra of ℘B and W, R, B, V is a model of classical logic.
Two C-structures U, B, ν and U , B , ν are said to be isomorphic (in
and
Prop/Definition 3.4 A pre-interpretation system C, M, A is an interpretation system iff it is closed under isomorphic images and disjoint unions 3 ; that is,
there exists a m ∈ M such that A(m ) = U , B , ν , and
and, for every
Proof. Equality If C, M, A is an interpretation system, then M is obviously a proper class. Given any pre-interpretation system C, M, A , we can always obtain the smallest interpretation system C, M, A c containing it, by making it closed under isomorphic images and disjoint unions in the obvious way (using (3.3-5) as definitions of U m , B m and ν mk ). We shall see below that this closure is not different in any essential way from the original pre-interpretation system with respect to the semantics of the logic at hand.
The contextual satisfaction relation is defined by
where δ ranges over L(C, Ξ) and u ranges over U . On the basis of this definition, we can define the floating satisfaction relation as follows: Sα δ means that Sαu δ holds for every u ∈ U , that is,
As usual, we will write (·) Γ as an abbreviation of: for every γ ∈ Γ, (·) γ.
where the superscripts p and d are meant to remind that the operators (·) 
Proposition 3.6 below will be frequently used in the paper and shows that the entailment operators of a pre-interpretation system are the same as those of its closure. The proofs of that proposition and of the following auxiliary lemma are straightforward.
Lemma 3.5 Assume that: (1) C, M, A is an interpretation system, (2) N and m are as in Definition 3.4, (3) α is a variable assignment over m, and (4) for every n ∈ N , α n is the restriction of α to n, that is, for every ξ ∈ Ξ,
Then, for every ϕ ∈ L(C, Ξ) and every n ∈ N , 
The closure under subalgebras of any interpretation system is defined in the obvious way. The following proposition is analogous to Proposition 3.6 and shows that also closing an interpretation system under subalgebras has no effect on the entailment operators.
Proposition 3.8 Assume that (1) C, M , A is the closure under subalgebras of the interpretation system
Convention. From now on, unless otherwise stated, all interpretation systems are assumed to be closed under subalgebras.
Prop/Definition 3.9 The fibring of the interpretation systems C , M , A and C , M , A is the interpretation system
where:
• M is the subclass of M × M composed of the pairs m , m such that:
• A( m , m ) = U, B, ν where:
Proof. We have to prove that C ∪ C , M, A is closed under unions and subalgebras.
Consider any subset
Let N and N be the subsets of M and M consisting respectively of first and of second components in elements of 
, and so on, and m turns out to be, as a matter of fact, isomorphic to m .
Categorial characterization
We start by defining the appropriate notion of morphism between interpretation systems. Then we proceed to define, within the category of interpretation systems, unconstrained fibring as a coproduct and constrained fibring by cocartesian lifting following, now at the semantic level, the categorial approach already adopted for Hilbert calculi.
Definition 3.11 An interpretation system morphism
is a pair h = h, h where:
such that for every m ∈ M :
Interpretation systems together with their morphisms constitute the category Int. Furthermore, the maps:
constitute the functor N : Int → Sig. This functor is rather useful for relating interpretation systems with their underlying signatures. More interestingly, given an interpretation system over C and signature morphism from C to C , we can build in a canonical way the corresponding interpretation system over C , as follows (using a cocartesian lifting): • M is the subclass of M such that: ν mk (c 1 ) = ν mk (c 2 ) whenever h(c 1 ) = h(c 2 );
Proof: Straightforward, following the method sketched in the proof of the corresponding result for Hilbert calculi (proposition 2.7).
We denote the codomain of the cocartesian morphism by h( C, M, A ). We are ready now to provide the envisaged categorial characterization: unconstrained fibring is a coproduct and constrained fibring is obtained by cocartesian lifting. • M is the subclass of M ×M composed of the pairs m , m such that:
endowed with the injections:
• i , p where i is the injection C → C ⊕ C and p is the projection M → M ;
• i , p where i is the injection C → C ⊕ C and p is the projection M → M .
Proof:
It is straightforward to verify that i , p , i , p are interpretation system morphisms and that the universal property of the coproduct holds. 
Proof: Note that coequalizers are surjective in the category of signatures (since coequalizers are epimorphisms in any category). It is trivial to verify that q is an interpretation system morphism and that the universal property of the cocartesian lifting holds. Clearly, when C is the intersection of C , C and we consider f , f to be the inclusions, this construction leads to C , M , A ∪ C , M , A , as defined in purely set-theoretic terms before. A logic system presentation L is said to be 
General logic systems
where α ranges over the set of variable assignments over S and u ranges over U . A model m in the interpretation system C, M, A is a model for the
Hilbert calculus C, P, D iff A(m) is a structure for C, P, D .
The following proposition is proved in [SSC99] for standard semantics. The adaptation of the proof to general semantics is obvious.
Proposition 4.3 If every model in L = C, M, A, P, D is a model for C, P, D , then L is p-sound and d-sound.
Of course, it makes no sense to say that m is a model for a given Hilbert calculus if an interpretation system to which m belongs, and hence a function A, are not provided. In particular cases, however, the set-theoretical structure of m provides a preferred related structure; this holds, for instance, for the models of intuitionistic logic considered in Example 3.3 and for the modal models consider below. In these cases, by 'a model of' a given Hilbert calculus, we will always mean a model such that its preferred structure is a structure for that Hilbert calculus. The models m and m fulfill the conditions of Definition 3.9 and hence we can consider the element m , m of M . Definition 3.9 implies also that A( m , m ) = S and this proves that every structure for C, P, D is A(m) for an m ∈ M . The converse inclusion is given by Lemma 4.5.
Definition 4.4 A logic system presentation C, M, A, P, D is full [resp. standard full] iff the image of the function A is the class of all structures [resp. standard structures ] for C, P, D .

Given any Hilbert calculus
Lemma 4.5 Let C , M , A , P , D and C , M , A , P , D be l.s.p.'s and assume that every model in M [M ] is a model for C , P , D [ C , P , D ].
Then, every model in C , M , A , P , D ∪ C , M , A , P , D is a model for
As for standard full l.s.p.'s, we have only to observe that, for
As a consequence of the proof of this theorem and of Proposition 4.3, we have that fibrings preserve soundness.
We turn our attention now to the problem of preservation of completeness by fibring. The examples considered below are based on results proved in [KW91] and in [Wol96] and concern modal and temporal logics endowed with standard semantics; thus, for every model m considered in the rest of this section, B m = ℘(U m ) is always assumed and we may omit B m in the presentation of these models.
Two examples from modal logic
Definition 4.7 We say that C is a modal signature based on the set Π iff: 1) C 0 = Π, 2) C 1 = {¬} ∪ {3 i } i∈I , where I is a set, 3) C 2 = {∧}, and 4)
The set {3 i } i∈I in a modal signature C will be referred to as the set of modalities in C. If, as a limit case, this set is empty, then we have that C is the signature of propositional logic based on Π. The fibring C ∪ C of two modal signatures is a modal signature.
A (standard) Kripke model for the modal signature C is a tuple W, {S i } i∈I , V in which W is a nonempty set, each S i is a binary relation on W (the accessibility relation for the operator 3 i ), and V : Π → ℘W . The Kripke C-structure based on the model W, {S i } i∈I , V is the triple W, ℘W, ν in which:
If, like in Example 2.4, 2 i is used as primitive modal operator instead of 3 i , then the rule corresponding to E2i is ν 1 (2 i )(b) = { w ∈ W : ∀w (wS i w → w ∈ b) } and this set is ν 1 (¬)ν 1 (3 i )ν 1 (¬)(b). In the sequel, we will shift freely from the 3 notation to the 2 notation and vice-versa.
The operators ν 1 (3 i ) and the relations S i are interdefinable by means of the following equivalence which is a consequence of (E2i).
Notice that this equivalence is meaningful because, we are here considering standard interpretation systems and hence each singleton {w } is always an admissible valuation.
Proposition 4.8 Let C, M, A a pre-interpretation system in which every element of M is a Kripke model. Then, every C-structure in the closure of C, M, A is isomorphic to a Kripke structure.
Proof. We have to show that, given any set N of Kripke models such that U n ∩ U n for all n = n in it, the C-structure U m , B m , ν m defined by means of (3.3-5) is isomorphic to a Kripke structure. Since each n ∈ N is a standard model, by (3.4), we have also B m = ℘(U m ). Equality (3.5) and straightforward boolean operations show that E0,1,3 hold for ν m . Assume now that each n ∈ N has the form W n , {S ni } i∈I , V n . For every i ∈ I, define the binary relation S mi on U m by S mi = ∪ n∈N S ni . By (3.5) and E2i, we have
Since the sets W n are pairwise disjoint, this equality implies
and hence ν m1 fulfills E2i.
Definition 4.9 We say that C, M, A is a modal interpretation system whenever, for every m ∈ M , there is a Kripke model m = W , {S i } i∈I , V , such that A(m) is the Kripke C-structure of m .
According to this definition, given any model m in a modal interpretation system, we can always assume that it is a Kripke model and that A(m) is the corresponding Kripke structure. By Proposition 4.8, any union of Kripke structures is (isomorphic to) a Kripke structure; moreover, the accessibility relations in the union are the set-theoretical unions of the corresponding accessibility relations. This proves the following proposition. Definition 4.12 Given any modal signature C, we say that C, P, D is a modal calculus whenever
where the sets P 0 , P 2 i , and D 0 are defined as in Example 2.4.
Furthermore, a modal logic system presentation is a tuple C, M, A, P, D in which C, M, A is a modal interpretation system and C, P, D is a modal calculus.
By Definition 2.5, the (possibly constrained) fibring of two modal calculi is still a modal calculus; it is (isomorphic to) the smallest modal calculus which contains the other two. Thus, fibrings of modal l.s.p.'s are modal l.s.p.'s.
In order to be able to apply the results proved in [KW91] and [Wol96] , in the next two subsections we assume that, for all modal logic system presentations C, M, A, P, D considered therein, no element of C 0 occurs in some rule in P or in D (4.5)
It must be also observed that the possibility of transferring the completeness result of [KW91] to fibring, uses in an essential way the assumption that interpretation systems are closed under disjoint unions. In order to avoid trivializing the problems, we also assume consistency; that is,
, for all provability and derivability operators considered in the next subsections.
An example of completeness preservation 4 .
The following theorem is a consequence of Theorem 1 in [KW91] . An example of non-preservation of completeness in temporal logic.
Definition 4.18 Given a modal signature C with {3 i } i∈I as set of modalities, the temporal signature based on C is the modal signature
The elements 3 i and 3 − i of C 1 , in a temporal signature, are usually referred to as the i-th future and past operators. Of course, every modal signature in which the set of modalities is infinite or has a finite even number of elements, can be viewed as a temporal signature; things become more interesting when we define the notion of temporal logic system presentation.
Definition 4.19 Given a temporal signature C
t , we will say that L = C t , M, A, P, D is a temporal logic system presentation whenever: (1) L is a modal logic system presentation, (2) every m = U,
It can be easily verified that any Kripke model for the temporal calculus C t , P, D is a temporal model. 
Thus, in the basic temporal logic system presentation K C t , we have that C t , P B , D B and C t , M B , A B are respectively the smallest temporal calculus and the largest temporal interpretation system for C t . Classical temporal logic results give that K C t is sound and complete.
Following [Wol96] , the minimal temporal extension of a modal logic can be obtained by 'duplicating' the modal operators and by adding the basic axioms for temporal logic of Def. 4.20. Formally: δ 1 , . . . , δ k , δ 1 , . . . , δ k in L(C, Ξ) , (δ 1 , . . . , δ k ) d c(δ 1 , . . . , δ Observation. Many well-known logics with a propositional basis enjoy the MTC. It is worth noticing that, if Γ were not required to be p-deductively closed, then MTC would fail in a wide class of logics, including modal and temporal logics. In fact, for k = 1 and Γ = {δ 1 , δ 1 }, the antecedent of MTC holds trivially in every Hilbert calculus, while, in modal logic, we do not have
In the sequel, we use the metalinguistic expression
Of course, from the premises of the MTC we can also infer Γ,
. . , δ k ) and, therefore, the MTC can be stated as follows:
Definition 5.2 Within a given Hilbert calculus C, P, D : 
In the first case, Γ 0 ∪ {γ } is a d-non-γ set and hence there is a m.d-c.s. u ∈ U which contains γ but does not contain γ; in the second case, we can reach the opposite conclusion. In both cases, we have |γ| = |γ |. If, conversely, E Γ 0 (γ, γ ) holds, (5.1) yields that γ belongs to every ddeductively closed set which contains Γ 0 ∪ {γ} and vice-versa; thus, every u ∈ U which contains γ contains also γ and vice-versa. (γ 1 , . . . , γ k ) and assume inductively that the thesis holds for γ 1 , . . . , γ k . Then, the following equalities hold
In particular, if α 0 is the variable assignment such that α 0 (ξ) = |ξ| for every ξ ∈ Ξ, then By Theorem 4.6, the fibring of full l.s.p.'s is full and, hence, if the MTC is also preserved, the previous theorem implies that completeness is preserved as well. Therefore, it is important to investigate whether congruence is preserved by fibring. Actually, it is not always preserved as the following counterexample shows.
Example 5.8 Consider the Hilbert calculi H = C , P , D and H = C , P , D defined as follows:
Clearly, MTC holds in both. In C , P , D , it holds vacuously since we have no constructors of arity greater than zero. In C , P , D , assume that Γ is p-deductively closed, Γ, δ 1 d δ 2 , and Γ, δ 2 d δ 1 . We have to establish Γ, c(δ 1 ) d c(δ 2 ). Since D = ∅ and using Γ, δ 1 d δ 2 , we have to consider only two cases: (1) δ 2 ∈ Γ: then, since Γ is p-deductively closed, c(δ 2 ) ∈ Γ and we are done by the extensiveness of derivation; (2) δ 2 is δ 1 : then, we have the conclusion directly by the extensiveness of derivation.
But the MTC does not hold in the constrained fibring H of H and H by sharing π 0 , π 1 , π 2 . In fact, consider Γ = {π 0 } p = {c n (π 0 ) : n ≥ 0}. Then, we have E Γ (π 1 , π 2 ), but we do not have E Γ (c(π 1 ), c(π 2 )).
Fortunately, there is a wide class of logics for which MTC is preserved by fibring as shown in the next section. 6 L.s.p.'s with equivalence. Preservation results. 
Since derivability implies provability and Γ is p-deductively closed, we have
Thus, by (iii) and monotonicity, from Γ we derive (δ 1 ⇒ δ 2 ). Therefore, it is trivial that if MTD holds in both given Hilbert calculi then it will hold in their fibring. Indeed, if (i) and (ii) hold in at least one of them, they will also hold in the fibring, again using (2.3). However, (iii) is required to hold in both of them since the fibring has the derivation rules of both. For each rule r = {γ 1 , . . . , γ k }, γ from each of the given calculi, we shall have
in the fibring invoking once again (2.3).
Note that, in this proposition, the assumption of sharing the implication is needed only for showing the preservation of the MTD, more specifically, in order to guarantee that (iii) above encompasses all derivation rules in the fibring. (c(δ 1 , . . . , δ k ) ⇔ c(δ 1 , . . . , δ k ) and hence they belong to this class. With respect to this, it is important to observe that these logics can be viewed as extensions of the logic called basic logic in [SBF] , which turns out to be a logic with equivalence as well (where ⇔ is defined on the basis of ⇒ and of &). This implies that other extensions of basic logic (like, e.g., linear logic and quantum logic) are also logics with equivalence and hence they enjoy MTC. Proposition 6.5 shows that the class of Hilbert calculi with equivalence is closed under fibrings if implication and equivalence are shared, and hence this kind of fibrings preserves also MTC. Incidentally, Example 5.8 shows that the calculi H and H considered therein, as well as their fibring H, cannot be endowed with equivalence without changing the provability and derivability in a substantial way.
A trivial consequence of Theorems 4.6 and 5.7 is that p-completeness and d-completeness of full l.s.p.'s with MTC is preserved by fibring whenever MTC is preserved. Thus, Proposition 6.5 and Theorem 6.6 imply the following theorem of preservation of completeness, which holds for all logics considered above. 
Concluding remarks
We obtained a (strong) completeness theorem for logic systems with full general semantics and with congruence, using an adapted Henkin construction. As a corollary, completeness was shown to be preserved by fibring logics with congruence provided that congruence is retained in the resulting logic. Although congruence is not always preserved by fibring, we were able to establish a sufficient condition for its preservation. This condition holds in every extension of basic logic, including classical, intuitionistic, minimal and all modal propositional logics.
General semantics was motivated by realizing that (weak) completeness is not always preserved when fibring logics with standard (non general) semantics. In the end, working with general semantics allowed us to obtain the envisaged preservation result for strong completeness. It remains an open problem if the positive result in Subsection 4.1 concerning the preservation of weak completeness can be improved.
General semantics is also interesting because it allows the faithful representation of the semantics of intuitionistic logic (contrarily to standard semantics as discussed in [SSC99] ). However, the fibring of intuitionistic logic with classical logic still leads to the collapsing of all connectives into classical logic. This is a well known problem with current accounts of fibring [Gab99] . At the proof-theoretic level it is possible to avoid the collapse by constraining the use of the axiom (ξ 1 → (ξ 2 → ξ 1 )) as proposed in [dCH96] . But at the model-theoretic level it is an open problem how to avoid the collapse.
It should be noted that it is necessary to be able to impose requirements in inference rules in order to be able to constrain their use. Therefore, the solution proposed in [dCH96] implies a more complex notion of Hilbert calculus, along the same lines in [SSCM99] where inference rules with requirements were introduced for another reason (for dealing with the problems of logics with variables, terms and binding operators).
Future work is planned at extending the transference result established in this paper to such more complex logics with variables, terms and binding operators.
